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Abstract: Control architecture for resource allocation 
in satellite networks is proposed, along with the 
specification of performance indexes and control 
strategies. The latter, besides being based on 
information on traffic statistics and network status, rely 
upon some knowledge of the fading conditions over the 
satellite network channels. The resource allocation 
problem consists of the assignment, by a master station, 
of a total available bandwidth among traffic earth 
stations in the presence of different traffic types. Traffic 
stations are assumed to measure continuously their 
signal fade level, but this information may either be used 
only locally or also communicated to the master station. 
According to the information made available on-line to 
the master station on the level of the fading attenuation 
of the traffic stations, the assignment can be made 
static, based on the a priori knowledge of long-term 
fading statistics, or dynamic, based on the updated 
measurements. In any case, the decisions can be 
adapted to slowly time-varying traffic characteristics. At 
each earth station, two basic traffic types are assumed 
to be present, namely guaranteed bandwidth, real-time, 
synchronous data (stream traffic), and best effort traffic 
(datagram traffic). Numerical results are provided for a 
specific architecture in the dynamic case, in a real 
environment, based on the Italian satellite national 
coverage payload characteristics. 
Keywords: Security, Denial of Service (DoS), Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks, Distributed Probing, Secure Routing 
Protocols, simulation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emerging field of wireless sensor networks 
combines sensing, computation, and communication 
into a single tiny device. Through advanced  mesh 
networking protocols, these devices form a sea of 
connectivity that extends the reach of cyberspace out 
into the physical world. As water flows to fill every room 
of a submerged ship, the mesh networking connectivity 
will seek out and exploit any possible  communication 
path by hopping data from node to node in search of its 
destination. While the capabilities of any single device 
are minimal, the composition of hundreds of devices 
offers radical new technological possibilities. 
         Fig. 1. Ad-hoc with connecting nodes   
 The most straightforward application of wireless sensor 
network technology is to monitor remote environments 
for low frequency data trends.   For example, a chemical 
plant could be easily monitored for leaks by hundreds of 
sensors that automatically form a wireless 
interconnection network and immediately report the 
detection of any chemical leaks.   Unlike traditional wired 
systems, deployment costs would be minimal. Instead of 
having to deploy thousands of feet of wire routed 
through protective conduct, installers. Adaptation 
mechanisms can respond to changes in network 
topologies or can cause the network to shift between 
drastically different modes of operation. Current wireless  
systems only scratch the surface of possibilities 
emerging from the integration of low-power 
communication, sensing, energy storage, and 
computation. 
Fig.2. Example of mobility 
Unlike traditional wireless devices, wireless 
sensor nodes do not need to communicate directly with 
the nearest high-power control tower or base station, but 
only with their local peers. Instead, of relying on a pre-
deployed infrastructure, each individual sensor or 
actuator becomes part of the overall infrastructure. 
Peer-to-peer networking protocols provide a mesh-like 
interconnect to shuttle data between the thousands of 
tiny embedded devices in a multi-hop fashion. The 
flexible mesh architectures envisioned dynamically 
adapt to support introduction of new nodes or expand to 
cover a larger geographic region.   Additionally, the 
system can automatically adapt to compensate for node 
failures. 
               The vision of mesh networking is based on 
strength in numbers. Unlike cell phone systems that 
deny service when too many phones are active in a 
small area, the interconnection of a wireless sensor 
network only grows stronger as nodes are added. As 
long as there is sufficient density, a single network of 
nodes can grow to cover limitless area.  
        II. ARCHITECTURE 
               The concept of wireless sensor networks is 
based on a simple equation: Sensing + CPU + Radio = 
Thousands of potential applications. 
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As soon as people understand the capabilities 
of a wireless sensor network, hundreds of applications 
spring to mind. It seems like a straightforward 
combination of modern technology. However, actually 
combining sensors, radios, and  
CPU's into an effective wireless sensor network requires 
a detailed understanding of the both capabilities and 
limitations of each of the underlying hardware 
components, as well as a detailed understanding of 
modern networking technologies and distributed 
systems theory. Each individual node must be designed 
to provide the set of primitives necessary to synthesize 
the interconnected web that will emerge as they are 
deployed, while meeting strict requirements of size, cost 
and power consumption. A core challenge is to map the 
overall system requirements down to individual device 
capabilities, requirements and actions.   To make the 
wireless sensor network vision a reality, architecture 
must be developed that synthesizes the envisioned 
applications out of the underlying hardware capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Example of a selective Random Packet 
To develop this system architecture we work 
from the high level application requirements down 
through the low-level hardware requirements. In this 
process we first attempt to understand the set of target 
applications. To limit the number of applications that we 
must consider, we focus on a set of application classes 
that we believe are representative of a large fraction of 
the potential usage scenarios. We use this set of 
application classes to explore the system-level 
requirements that are placed on the overall architecture. 
From these system-level requirements we can then drill 
down into the individual node-level requirements. 
Additionally, we must provide a detailed background into 
the capabilities of modern hardware. 
After we present the raw hardware capabilities, 
we present a basic wireless sensor node. The Rene 
node represents a first cut at system architecture, and 
is used for comparison against the system architectures. 
2.1 Sensor network application classes 
The three application classes we have selected 
are: environmental data collection, security monitoring, 
and sensor node tracking. We believe that the majority 
of wireless sensor network deployments will fall into one 
of these class templates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of an Attack Model 
2.1.1 Environmental Data Collection 
A canonical environmental data collection 
application is one where a research scientist wants to 
collect several sensor readings from a set of points in an 
environment over a period of time in order to detect 
trends and interdependencies. For the data to be 
meaningful it would have to be collected at regular 
intervals and the nodes would remain at known locations. 
Fig. 5. Example of Monitor identification method 
At the network level, the environmental data 
collection application is characterized by having a large 
number of nodes continually sensing and transmitting 
data back to a set of base stations that store the data 
using traditional methods.   These networks generally 
require very low data rates and extremely long lifetimes. 
In typical usage scenario, the nodes will be evenly 
distributed over an outdoor environment.   This distance 
between adjacent nodes will be minimal yet the distance 
across the entire network will be significant. 
The routing strategy can then be used to route 
data to a central collection points. In environmental 
monitoring applications, While the time variant nature of 
RF communication may cause connectivity between two 
nodes to be intermittent, the overall topology of the 
network will be relatively stable.  Environmental data 
collection applications typically use tree-based routing 
topologies where each routing tree is rooted at high-
capability nodes that sink data.   Data is periodically 
transmitted from child node to parent node up the tree-
structure until it reaches the sink. With tree-based data 
collection each node is responsible for forwarding the 
data of all its descendants. The most important 
characteristics of the environmental monitoring 
requirements are long lifetime, precise synchronization, 
low data rates and relatively static topologies. The data 
transmissions can be delayed inside the network as 
necessary in order to improve network efficiency. 
2.1.2 Security Monitoring 
   Security monitoring networks are composed 
of nodes that are placed at fixed locations throughout an 
environment that continually monitor one or more 
sensors to detect an anomaly.   A key difference 
between security monitoring and environmental 
monitoring is that security networks are not actually 
collecting any data. Each node has to frequently check 
the status of its sensors but it only has to transmit a 
data report when there is a security violation.  
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Fig.6. An Example of Filtering fields 
 If a node were to be disabled or fail, it would represent a 
security violation that should be reported. For security 
monitoring applications, the network must be configured 
so that nodes are responsible for confirming the status 
of each other.             
The accepted norm for security systems today is that 
each sensor should be checked approximately once per 
hour. Combined with the ability to evenly distribute the 
load of checking nodes, the energy cost of performing 
this check becomes minimal. Once detected, a security 
violation must be communicated to the base station 
immediately.   The latency of the data communication 
across the network to the base station has a critical 
impact on application performance.   Users demand that 
alarm situations be reported within seconds of detection.   
This means that network nodes must be able to respond 
quickly to requests from their neighbors to forward data. 
In security networks reducing the latency of an alarm 
transmission is significantly more important than 
reducing the energy cost of the transmissions.   This is 
because alarm events are expected to be rare.   In a fire 
security system alarms would almost never be signaled.   
In the event that one does occur a significant amount of 
energy could be dedicated to the transmission. 
Reducing the transmission latency leads to higher 
energy consumption because routing nodes must 
monitor the radio channel more frequently. 
2.1.3 Node tracking scenarios 
The system breaks down when objects do not flow from 
checkpoint to checkpoint. In typical work environments it 
is impractical to expect objects to be continually passed 
through checkpoints.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7. An Example of Filtering fields 
With wireless sensor networks, objects can be 
tracked by simply tagging them with a small sensor 
node.   The sensor node will be tracked as it moves 
through a field of sensor nodes that are deployed in the 
environment at known locations.    Instead of sensing 
environmental data, these nodes will be deployed to 
sense the RF messages of the nodes attached to 
various objects.   A database can be used to record the 
location of tracked objects relative to the set of nodes at 
known locations.    With this system, it becomes 
possible to ask where an object is currently, not simply 
where it was last scanned. 
2.2 System Evaluation Metrics 
One goal of this context is to present an understanding 
of the tradeoffs that link each axis of this space and an 
understanding of current capabilities. The architectural 
improvements and optimizations we present in later 
chapters are then motivated by increasing the ability to 
deliver these capabilities and increasing the volume of 
the capability hypercube. 
3.1 PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
3.1 Audit Source Location 
Since the audit source is the most important source of 
information about ongoing activity in the supervised 
environment, the result of problems here can be 
devastating for the performance of an IDS. This section 
covers the main problems with the different audit 
sources. 
3.1.1 Network Packets 
The audit source most used today is network packets. 
When data is picked up before it has reached its 
destination, as is done when picking up network 
packets, there is a problem if the data has been 
encrypted in any malicious behavior hidden within the 
packet can pass undetected. To successfully monitor a 
switched network an IDS is either needed on each 
individual segment or on each of the switches span 
ports.  
3.1.2 Host and Application Log Files 
This makes it easy for attackers to evade detection 
by the IDS. A performance problem can arise if we 
want to increase the amount of logging.. Intrusion 
Detection Systems – Technologies, Weaknesses 
Trends Problems and Challenges. 
3.1.3 System and API Calls 
The downside of it is that several attacks exploit the 
same flaw and therefore look the same on this level in 
the system. Therefore, it is very hard to differentiate 
between different attacks and to truly know the 
originating process. Because of this, an IDS that uses 
system and API calls as its primary source will 
sometimes generate the same general event for several 
different attacks. This makes finding and stopping the 
source of the attack much harder. 
3.1.4 IDS Sensor Alerts 
The problem is that they all have implemented the 
communication different from each other. This makes it 
very hard to manage and supervise several IDSs from 
different vendors at the same console. In addition, 
SNMP messages are quite simple in nature and limit the 
amount and type of information that can be sent. 
3.2 Detection Method 
One problem that all detection methods suffer from is 
the difficulty of keeping the false positive rate small 
relative the true positive rate. Even if the IDS has a 
small false positive rate, say 0.1%, the number of false 
alarms related to the number of real alarms will be high. 
The problem is based on a statistical phenomenon 
called the base-rate fallacy.  
3.2.1 Knowledge-based 
The main problem with knowledge-based detection 
methods is that they cannot detect attacks for which no 
signature exists. Without constant updating of the 
signatures the IDS will have problems detecting new 
attacks. Another problem with signatures is that if they 
are too narrow an attacker could potentially bypass the 
IDS by changing the attack slightly. 
Council for Innovative Research                                                  International Journal of Computers & Technology 
www.cirworld.com                                                                      Volume 5, No. 1, May -June, 2013, ISSN 2277-3061 
32 | P a g e                                                     w w w . i j c t o n l i n e . c o m  
3.2.2 Behaviors-base 
This is a very good approach to detecting attacks since 
it can also detect new attacks, but these methods have 
some major disadvantages. One big problem is how to 
define what is normal. Looking at, for example, network 
packets to detect anomalies (as the behavior-based part 
of protocol decode does) the IDS searches for 
deviations from the protocol specification for the actual 
protocols analyzed.  
3.3 Behavior on Detection 
When used with proactive/reactive responses, an IDS 
could easily be fooled into blocking random addresses. 
Carelessly implementing automated passive alerts could 
result in the Intrusion Detection Systems – 
Technologies, Weaknesses and Trends Problems and 
Challenges security officer being paged in the middle of 
the night every time someone scanned the ports on the 
outer firewall. 
3.3.1 Passive Alerting 
The most common response used in the studied IDSs is 
notify console. Every time an event triggers this 
response, the user interface of the IDS is updated with 
the new alert information. The monitoring security 
officers review the alerts, True session recording, where 
the packet payload is recorded as well, requires even 
more resources.  
3.3.2 Reactive Response 
If the attack involved installing a listening service, like a 
telnet daemon, blocking the IP-address of the attack 
only bought the time it takes for the attacker to hijack a 
different IP-address and logon to the newly installed 
service.  
3.3.3 Proactive Response 
False positives are particularly dangerous in this area. 
Proactive responses prevent system calls from 
executing, and false positives could lead to a denial of 
service situation for a legitimate application or process 
running at the host. Automatic proactive/reactive 
responses should only be used when confidentiality and 
integrity outweighs availability. 
3.4 Usage Frequency 
Most of the systems studied continuously monitor their 
audit sources. To be able to detect an attack as fast as 
possible, this is necessary. The problem is that it can be 
really resource exhausting. A NIDS monitoring a gigabit 
connection can have a lot of Intrusion Detection 
Systems – Technologies, Weaknesses and Trends  
4. PROPOSED MECHANISM 
We described the fundamental concept behind   discrete 
time event-driven simulations; it is easy to implement a 
toy simulation runtime that can process events. 
However, the implementation found in a real simulator is 
considerably more complex due to the need to export 
this functionality behind a programming interface that is 
easy to use and that does not significantly aspect 
performance. The event execution main loop but there is 
other operations that are fundamental to a discrete time 
event-driven simulator:  
 Run: execute every event in order of increasing 
timestamps until there are no more events or the 
user triggers Stop. 
Stop: set the global stop flag to true to make sure that 
the Run function returns at the next available 
opportunity. 
Schedule: create a new event, insert it in the global 
event list, and return a reference to the newly-created 
event. 
Cancel: disable the execution of an event that is present 
in the global event list. 
Cancel is usually considered a constant-time operation 
that merely sets a disabled flag in the event that is 
checked by Run before executing that event. 
 Remove: Remove an event from the global event list to 
ensure that it is never executed. This operation is 
usually considered to be of O (n) complexity (where n is 
the number of events). 
Status: return whether an existing event has expired or 
is still running In practice, there is very little variance 
across deferent simulators in the way these functions 
are exported to users except on the way the simulation  
time is represented and on how simulation events are 
created and managed. In the these two aspects of the 
ns-3, Cisco packet tracer simulation runtime library. We 
first consider the representation of simulation time in 
section and then discuss how simulation events are 
created and managed. 
The example below shows how this might be done: 
Users can derive from the Event base class and provide 
their own version of the Expire method: 
 Class MyEvent: public Event { 
 virtual void  Expire (void) { 
 // do my thing here 
} 
} ; 
 MyEvent * event = new MyEvent ( ); 
 Schedule (Seconds (10. 0), event); 
DISCRETE TIME EVENT-DRIVEN SIMULATIONS 
This protocol requires the sender to deal with three 
types of events: DataReceived, AckReceived and 
AckTimeout. Whenever we receive data, we need to 
send back an ACK: 
Class DataReceived: public Event { 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_src; 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_dst; 
Data *m_data; 
Virtual void Expire (void) { 
 AckReceived * ack = new AckReceived ( ); 
 ack->m_src = m_dst; 
 ack->m_dst = m_src; 
 ack->m data = m_data; 
Time delay = . . . ; 
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Schedule (delay, ack); 
} 
} ; 
Whenever we receive an ACK, we need to cancel our 
ACK timeout and send the next packet present in our 
transmission queue: 
 class  AckReceived : public Event { 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_src; 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_dst; 
 Data *m_data; 
 Virtual void Expire (void) { 
 If (m_dst->m_currentData! = m_data) { 
 // we arrived too late? 
 } else { 
 Cancel (m_dst->ackTimeout); 
 Data _ next = m_dst->m_ txQueue->GetNext ( ) 
 m_dst->Send (next); 
} 
} 
} ; 
If we are not lucky and the ACK is not received before 
the ACK timeout expires, we need to retransmit our 
data: 
 class AckTimeout: public Event { 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_ sender; 
 virtual void Expire (void) { 
 m_sender->Send (m_protocol->m_ sender); 
} 
} ; 
Finally, to send data, we first start the ACK timeout and 
then create a receive event for the receiver. 
 class StopAndWaitArqProtocol { 
 friend class AckTimeout; 
 friend class AckReceived; 
 friend class DataReceived; 
 StopAndWaitArqProtocol *m_other; 
 Void Send (Data*data) { 
 m_currentData = data; 
 AckTimeout _ timeout = new AckTimeout ( ); 
 Timeout->m sender = this; 
 Schedule (Seconds (1) , timeout ) ; 
 Time delay = . . . ; 
 DataReceived _ received = new DataReceived ( ); 
received->m_src = this; 
 received->m_dst = m_other ; 
Schedule (delay, received); 
} 
} ; 
The problem with this approach is that we are forced to 
split the entire protocol implementation in many 
subclasses which need to manipulate both states that is 
local to them and that is shared with the protocol 
instances communicating together. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has presented a system architecture for 
wireless sensor nodes that is capable of addressing the 
strict requirements of wireless sensor networks. By 
utilizing a single shared controller that is augmented by 
a collection of specialized hardware accelerators, the 
architecture is able to support flexible, application-
specific communications protocols without sacrificing 
efficiency. This architecture has been validated through 
the development of three hardware platforms and a 
software operating system architecture that addresses 
key issues that arise when building a wireless sensor 
network device that must meet strict power consumption 
and size requirements. They include: flexibility, fine-
grained concurrency, precise synchronization, and 
decoupling between RF and data path speed.    The 
platform must be flexible enough to meet the wide range 
of application requirements that sensor networks are 
addressing. We have identified core application 
scenarios that range from environmental data collection, 
to security networks, to node tracking networks. Each 
scenario has substantially different communication 
patters and protocols that must be supported by single 
hardware architecture.  
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